Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) versus Pakistan People’s Party (PPP):

The election was remarkable due to the large voter turnout, but also because the US government did not pick any favorites. This could be an effect of the broken-down US-Pakistan relationship which soured under the People’s Party-led administration. Though the PPP has traditionally been more pro-American than the PML-N, Dr Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute explains that it was was too weak to deliver as it had been discredited in the eyes of the public. This made the PPP a less effective partner for the US government. In contrast, Sharif won by a large electoral margin and “has experience in the business of governing, which will provide greater stability to Pakistan, as well as to US-Pakistan relations,” says Weinbaum.

Dan Markey, a scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, echoed this sentiment and stated that “a stable but marginally more prickly Pakistan under the PML-N is better than a less stable, more obsequious Pakistan under the PPP.” This “prickliness” may have more to do with the right-wing nationalist ideology of the PML-N than Sharif’s personal views on the US. Sharif’s political base will expect him to at least nominally push back against the US on some issues.

Michael Kugelman, a scholar at the Wilson Center, said “even though the PPP is regarded as more pro-US than the PML-N, let’s not forget that Washington has worked with Nawaz Sharif before.” In fact, Sharif recently stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that, “the relationship with the US was quite good when I was in power,” and that “I’d like to take this relationship further. We need to strengthen the relationship.”

PML-N versus Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf (PTI):

Statements like these, along with his prior experience working with Washington, have allowed Sharif to cultivate an international reputation for being a principled pragmatist who has learned a great deal from his time in and out of power. On the other hand, his closest electoral rival, Imran Khan, was seen with trepidation by American experts due to his inexperience and extreme rhetoric concerning the US.

“Pakistan dodged a bullet by choosing Sharif over Khan”
Dr Weinbaum said some of the positive feeling in Washington relating to Sharif’s win relates to the American policymakers’ fears about Imran Khan coming to power because “the kind of shaking up Khan wanted to do was unnerving.” Sadanand Dhume, a scholar for the American Enterprise Institute, went further to say that “Pakistan dodged a bullet by choosing Sharif over Khan. The latter’s well known antipathy for the US, and simplistic ideas about drones, would have complicated relations with Washington.”

Campaign rhetoric versus government policy:

Imran Khan was not alone in his critique of the US-Pakistan policy during the run-up to the elections. Nawaz Sharif also made certain anti-America statements. However, experts in Washington took these statements with a grain of salt. “I think that the rhetoric he expressed is written off as necessary campaign rhetoric and I believe he understands that governing and campaigning are different,” Dr Weinbaum said. Kugelman said “despite all his anti-American rhetoric on the campaign trail, we can expect him to work very closely with Washington in the weeks ahead.”

Some have raised doubts about Sharif as a potential “wolf in sheep’s clothing” due to his insistence on negotiating with the Taliban and his party’s affiliations with banned terrorist outfits. Dr Weinbaum disagrees with this categorization, stating that one must distinguish “someone who has better ties with the religious establishment from someone who doesn’t recognize that extremism is a real threat.” The belief among experts seems to be that Sharif would take a harder line on extremism after the elections. Aparna Pande, a research fellow at the Hudson Institute, said while Nawaz may have said he wants to negotiate, that was when he was in opposition and seeking votes through populism. “He may have a slightly different view when he is in power and has to make policy.”

Though Sharif and Khan’s rhetoric matched pitch at points in the election, the perception amongst American experts is that Sharif was playing to the galleries but would eventually pursue a pragmatic policy while in office. Dhume says that between Sharif and Khan: “Sharif has been much more circumspect in his sympathy for the Taliban… [and] he will take genuine US security concerns into account while formulating his Afghan policy.”

From strategic ties to tactical relations:

As Nawaz Sharif gears up to take over the prime minister’s spot, experts were asked whether US-Pakistan relations would be realigned in a major way in the coming months. Almost all respondents said there would be no major shifts due to the unchanging military basis of US-Pakistan ties. Kugleman said US-Pakistan relations were ultimately driven by military-to-military ties, which is why he doubts that “Pakistan’s political transition will lead to an outright realignment.” Pande said similarly that US-Pakistan relations were largely based on a “security military angle” and that a major realignment would require “the civilians to be able to regain space in the foreign and security spheres of decision-making in their country,” which is unlikely in the short term.

While the shift in policy may not be major, American policy makers will likely avoid grandstand strategic relationships in favor of a more tactical relationship based on the reality that US and Pakistani interests incurably diverge on some points. Pande said that while Obama pursued a strategic policy with Pakistan in his first term, “I see a return to a tactical relationship,” with Sharif’s electoral win during Obama’s second term. Dhume echoed this sentiment. “Neither country is in the mood for an expansive new embrace as in 2008.”

Rather, Kugelman says the relationship will be a new model of “scaled-back, nonetheless sustained cooperation.” He went on to explain that there was “a realization, on both sides, that expectations from the relationship needed to be reduced, so that the two sides could focus on the few potential areas of cooperation that do exist.” This means that both countries will focus on their shared interests, such as trade, which is a high priority for the Sharif administration. It has reached out to the US government several times in the last few years to discuss cooperation on the matter.

In areas where the countries are less likely to agree, such as drone attacks, neither side will push for a zero sum result of either conducting drone attacks every day or prohibiting them completely. Instead, Sharif will likely allow the military to continue setting the negotiating policy with the US on drones, despite his party base’s repulsion to the strikes. He will avoid bringing public attention to the matter, and in return Dan Markey argues that the US government should consider minimizing drone strikes for a period of time in order to avoid damaging Sharif’s credibility for his non-confrontational policy. Eventually, under this new tactical relationship, there could be a time when the countries agree to greater cooperation, giving Pakistan a role in the drone targeting program, which could answer concerns about sovereignty and allegations that fighting terrorism is somehow only “America’s War.”

Waris Husain is a Member of the Board of Americans for Democracy and Justice in Pakistan. His column was originally published in Pakistan by The Friday Times, and can be read here.

Shahid Khan immigrated from Pakistan to the United States with $500. Since then, he has built a multi-billion dollar fortune, demonstrating just how much Pakistanis and Americans can achieve when we work together towards a common goal.

On Friday, Hussain Nadim explained for Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel why Pakistan won’t give up Hafiz Saeed. In his piece, Mr. Nadim suggests, as many have before him, that Pakistan does not view the Jamaat-ud-Dawa leader as a direct threat but rather sees him a useful proxy in Pakistan’s ongoing struggle with India for control of Kashmir. The author then adds to this banal analysis by suggesting that Hafiz Saeed has “rebranded himself as a political and social actor renouncing violence altogether.” This is a dangerous fantasy.

Almost exactly one year ago, Hafiz Saeed addressed a rally in Lahore to raise money for jihad against the United States. And lest we be mistaken, Saeed’s idea of jihad is not one of a personal and intellectual struggle against evil – he’s talking about guns and bombs.

In a fiery Friday sermon, Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed called on the people to wage jihad against America in order to save Pakistan and Islam. “Come to us. We will teach you the meaning of jihad… The time to fight has come.”

The sermon was held at the JuD head office Jamia Markaz al-Qadsia in Lahore, where Saeed had his own security. Some of the security personnel were also seen carrying weapons with silencers. A box was placed at the exit and men asked for people exiting the mosque to give funds for jihad.

In December, Hafiz Saeed met with Kashmiri separatist leaders and assured them that “militancy in Kashmir would escalate after the US-led international troops depart from Afghanistan in 2014.”

This is the same Hafiz Saeed that Hussain Nadim claims has renounced violence.

Hussain Nadim also repeats the myth that Hafiz Saeed’s organization Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) is a “charity organization.” But JuD is a charity organization in the mold of HAMAS and other militant organizations. Yes, they do conduct some relief work, but even that seems to be more part of a PR campaign designed to build sympathies among the people for their less charitable works. And JuD includes in its arsenal an impressive multi-national PR machine.

Tweeting last year, the “charity organization” called on God to destroy the United States.

O Allah! annihilate #US with Your authority and power, O Allah! Let all they have done be done to them. O Allah! show us their black day.

— Jamat ‘ud’ Da’wah(@JuD_Official) April 4, 2012

And in Pakistan, away from gullible Western journalists, JuD is very open about their broader mission. The following amateur video shows a JuD procession accompanied by chants of “Only one cure for America – Jihad! Jihad!”

And as for the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC), which Hussain Nadim describes as “one of the movements led by Hafiz Saeed that has united and mobilized followers of different radical ideologies, which Pakistani officials hope will create a force to broker peace between the government and militants,” we’ll let Hafiz Saeed speak for himself:

“We have only one objective: to form a civilian force for the defence of Pakistan, which can work alongside Pakistan forces, because Pakistan is facing very severe threats from both sides – India is one side, America and NATO forces are on the other and the agenda of both is Pakistan.”

Pakistani police may believe, as Hussain Nadim claims, that “Saeed has been redirected and is now being used as a tool to ensure the disarmament and evolution of militant groups in Pakistan,” but there is little evidence to suggest this is the case. What is far more evident is that Hafiz Saeed is doing what he’s always done – running a sophisticated paramilitary operation under the cover of a religious charity.

Willfully ignoring reality is unlikely to magically transform Saeed from mujahideen to statesman. And, unfortuantely, whether or not “Pakistan will have to live with the burden of being blamed for supporting militants like Hafiz Saeed” is beside the point. As long as militant leaders like Hafiz Saeed are allowed to act with impunity, Pakistan will continue to suffer the carnage and internal destabilization that they sow.

As Pakistan prepares for its historic elections in May, progressive leaders continue to literally be driven from the country by forces of intolerance – a practice that has been a hallmark of political dysfunction in Pakistan for decades. Benazir Bhutto spent years in exile, only to be murdered upon her return. Salmaan Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti were killed for speaking out in support of minority rights. Even a young girl’s demand for an education was considered so great a threat that Taliban militants tried to kill her.

Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Sherry Rehman, has been an outspoken and unwavering defender of minority rights and it has put her in constant danger. Following the assassination of Governor Salmaan Taseer in 2011, Rehman lived under self-imposed house arrest as local clerics demanded she be killed. Rehman soon found herself in Washington, DC where she was an ardent advocate for her country, only to have the Supreme Court order police to investigate her on charges of blasphemy – a capital offense, and one that is so prejudicial that the mere accusation can result in vigilante killing.

Ambassador Rehman returned to Pakistan earlier this month in preparation for the transition to an interim government during this year’s elections despite possible threats to her safety, and some are speculating that the Supreme Court’s sudden interest in blasphemy charges against Rehman are part of a high-stakes political campaign to determine the direction of the country. Christopher Dickey reported for Newsweek earlier this week that,

The court’s action appears largely political: an effort by far-right religious and nationalist forces to discredit the government of Rehman’s friend and ally, President Asif Ali Zardari, as it heads into elections this spring. Last year the courts forced out the prime minister, and in January they briefly ordered the arrest of his successor. Rehman’s predecessor as ambassador in Washington, Husain Haqqani, was accused of treason because of his close relations with U.S. officials before and after the Obama administration killed bin Laden. Haqqani, who vehemently denies the allegation, now lives in Boston, effectively exiled from his homeland.

Even those progressive voices that have been exiled seem to be in the crosshairs of. In a most extraordinary move earlier this month, Pakistan’s Supreme Court said that “If Hussain Haqqani does not come back willingly then he will be brought back forcibly.” Pakistan’s Supreme Court directed that such orders be delivered to Pakistan’s Embassy in the US, raising the specter, however implausible it may sound, of kidnapping under the auspices of “extraordinary rendition.”

Most recently, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari – the young Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party – decided not to appear at campaign rallies leading up to the elections, choosing to coordinate campaign efforts from Dubai due to security concerns. Why would a 25-year-old who has never held elected office face security concerns in his home country? Perhaps because the PPP scion has been one of the few Pakistani leaders to consistently speak out against injustice in his country.

Following the assassination of Salmaan Taseer, Bilawal was one of the few to speak out forcefully against religious discrimination, violence, and terrorism. He was quick to condemn the attempted murder of girls’ education activist Malala Yousafzai, and has consistently called for the protection of Pakistan’s religious minorities.

While progressives face threats from both vigilantes and the courts, Pakistan’s extremists seem to move about freely – even participating in national elections. The Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) – an offshoot of the anti-Shia terrorist group Sipah-e-Sahabah Pakistan (SSP) has formed an electoral alliance with other right-wing religious parties called the Muttahida Deeni Muhaaz (MDM) which is campaigning on a platform of replacing Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy with an Islamic caliphate, replacing the country’s current laws with an extreme interpretation of Sharia that bans non-Muslims, Shias, and women from holding public office or leading intelligence agencies, and providing “complete moral support” to the Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri militants.

Pakistan has a long and proud tradition of progressive leaders dating back to the nation’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, whose vision of a Pakistan in which “you may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State” was quickly hijacked by religious extremists. Those who worked to move Pakistan forward – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Salmaan Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti, Malala Yousafzai, and countless others – have found themselves attacked and killed for speaking out against injustice.

As Pakistanis prepare for elections in May, let us hope that a clear message is sent – that the people of Pakistan will choose their own leaders without fear or intimidation, and that, in the words of Ambassador Rehman, “Pakistan…not be allowed to turn into a country where a person is killed for their beliefs.”

Tahir-ul-Qadri’s demonstration in Islamabad dominated headlines last week, but it was another set of protests that are more likely to shape Pakistan’s future. While thousands rallied in support of election reforms, thousands of other Pakistanis were demanding basic security for themselves and their families.

Following a terrorist attack that killed almost 100 Shia, families refused to bury their dead, instead taking them into the streets of Quetta and refusing to leave until the Army was directed to take over security in the region.

The sit-in was about more than the devastating attack that preceded it, though. It was an outcry from a community that has been attacked mercilessly for years. In fact, more Pakistanis are being killed in sectarian attacks than in drone strikes. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, between 218 and 343 Pakistanis died in drone strikes last year. But by September of the same year, at least 320 Shia were killed in sectarian attacks according to Human Rights Watch – and this was before attacks that killed dozens more during Muharram. The attack in Quetta last week alone killed almost double the number of people as drones in 2013, setting a very worrying start to a new year.

Most of the anti-Shia attacks, including last week’s, are being carried out by the militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) led by a man named Malik Ishaq. What’s troubling, though, is that Malik Ishaq is not hiding in a cave somewhere. He not only operates very openly, but with at least tacit support from very powerful institutions in Pakistan.

After spending several years in jail on dozens of terrorism charges, Malik Ishaq was freed by the Lahore High Court due to lack of evidence in the summer of 2011. On hand at his release were a number of influential religious figures including the head of the Pakistan Ulema Council, Tahir Ashrafi, who was photographed riding next to a garlanded Ishaq as he drove away. The Express Tribune, an English-language daily in Pakistan, reported that Ashrafi said he believes “Ishaq should be integrated in mainstream religious parties claiming he has now been deradicalised.” Shortly thereafter, Ishaq began organizing anti-Shia rallies across Pakistan.

But it’s not just Tahir Ashrafi who has supported Malik Ishaq since his release. Last year, Malik Ishaq appeared on stage at a Difa-e-Pakistan (DPC) rally in Multan alongside Tahir Ashrafi, Sheikh Rashid, Hafiz Saeed, Hamid Gul and a number of other prominent religious and political actors.

Even while he was in prison, Ishaq was receiving support through some official channels. In 2011, Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah confirmed that he LeJ leader’s family had been receiving monthly payments from the provincial government since the PML-N took power there in 2008. In 2012, the PML-N enjoyed election support from the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) after Malik Ishaq was given the position of Vice President. And earlier this month the PML-N and ASWJ held a joint press conference to denounce Tahir-ul-Qadri as pursuing a foreign agenda.

As if on cue, Tahir Ashrafi is now threatening legal action against a group of Pakistani bloggers who write about sectarian attacks in Pakistan, claiming that they are “Irani[an] loyalists [who] have been directed to spread lies to incite conflict in Pakistan.” Given his connections to Malik Ishaq, it will be hard for Pakistan’s Shia not to hear sectarian tones in Ashrafi’s allegation that Shia-majority Iran is attempting to “incite conflict in Pakistan” by raising awareness of anti-Shia violence.

TIME’s Omar Waraich warns that anti-Shia violence in Pakistan could ignite regional conflict with Iran “have grave consequences not just for the country but also the wider region”, and it is certainly true that tension with a third neighbor is the last thing that Pakistan needs right now. Of greater concern, however, is, as Waraich observes, the internal threat of destabilization that anti-Shia violence presents. Politicians from across the political spectrum were quick to condemn last week’s bombing in Quetta. But as Pakistan’s Shia lose their patience – and their lives – a more tangible solution to the crisis is needed soon.

The Tahir-ul-Qadri show appears to have ended as quickly as it began. After brief talks with the government, a five-point agreement was signed and both sides declared victory. In fact, in many ways it seems that almost everyone came out a winner – Dr. Qadri got the government to agree to give him some input in who will serve as caretake Prime Minister; the PPP-coalition government skillfully defused a potentially messy situation not through force, but through compromise; and the PML-N did not hijack the demonstration or exploit it for short-term gain, but emphasized the importance of following the Constitution and the democratic process. The only group that really gained nothing was Imran Khan. The question is, did the events of the past week actually render him irrelevant?

Over the past few years, Imran Khan has spent significant time and money trying to transform his political party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), from a one-man show to a national political player. His mammoth rallies in 2011 promised to do just that. But even at the time, Michael Kugelman saw this as potentially peaking too soon.

Kugelman had an important point. Elections were not expected for almost two years, and there’s a chasm of difference between building excitement about a candidate and actually forcing early elections. And as every political professional knows too well, time management is essential to a successful campaign – with too little time you can’t effectively engage voters; with too much you run the risk of losing their interest.

By coming out so strong so early, Imran Khan took a big gamble. True, he needed the time to not only gather support but to demonstrate that he was a legitimate contender. Politicians at the level of Javed Hashmi and Shah Mehmood Qureshi weren’t going to join PTI unless they had significant reason to believe that it had a chance in national elections. But with so much time before the current administration’s term comes to an end, there was a real risk that something could go wrong or that people would lose interest.

A few months ago, Michael Kugelman revisited his 2011 thesis, suggesting that Imran Khan was “taking some time out to rethink his problematic political strategy and platform.” While Khan was thinking, though, Tahir-ul-Qadri was preparing to act. The Canadian cleric arrived in Pakistan not years, but months before elections were expected. His timing was impeccable.

While Qadri was leading his supporters on a march to Islamabad, Imran Khan was forced to decide if he was going to join Qadri’s march – as a supporting actor. In the end, Khan chose to try to support Qadri’s agenda without actually joining his action.

We are not joining the march by Dr Qadri because until caretaker govt is formed it is premature. However what he is saying is our agenda too

— Imran Khan (@ImranKhanPTI) January 14, 2013

Khan’s Tweet betrays him, though. Qadri’s agenda was about who had a say in choosing the caretaker government. If that was Imran Khan’s agenda, as he claimed, the march would have to come before the formation of the caretaker government otherwise their demands would be moot.

From the sidelines, Khan held a press conference and issued demands of his own – including that President Zardari resign immediately; that the Election Commission of Pakistan take notice of “pre-poll rigging” in the form of “distributing laptops and through the Benazir Income Support Programme”; and that the sitting Prime Minister be arrested. But by this point, hardly anyone was paying attention to Imran Khan. Tahir-ul-Qadri was the man of the hour.

Two days later, Tahir-ul-Qadri achieved what Imran Khan couldn’t achieve in two years – he got to government to agree to a specific timeline and set of reforms that would help shape the coming elections. Most importantly, Tahir-ul-Qadri – whose Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) party has exactly zero elected seats in parliament – managed to get the extraordinary concession of a seat at the table in the discussion of who will lead the caretaker setup.

Today, Reuters reported that PAT is considering contesting elections after sitting them out in 2008. Despite turning out an estimated 50,000 people to his protest, however, it is unlikely that Qadri has the electoral support to present much of a threat to the PPP or PML-N’s entrenched vote bases. But Qadri may be able to present a significant threat to PTI by splitting the protest vote.

In politics, nothing succeeds like success, and after the events of the past week, some of Imran Khan’s supporters may see in Tahir-ul-Qadri a more viable vehicle for their reformist agenda. That Qadri’s Minhaj-ul-Quran is aligned with a moderate, sufi-informed school of Islam also gives the PAT leader religious credentials without the accusations of being a Taliban sympathizer.

Whether or not Tahir-ul-Qadri does decide to contest the elections, however, it remains to be seen if Imran Khan can recover from a week in which he was relegated to the sidelines during an event that capitalized on what were supposed to be his two major strengths – the ability to mobilize a large number of people, and public desire for a new choice in politics. Tahir-ul-Qadri may have come to Islamabad looking to end the political careers of Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, but as the dust begins to settle, it looks like Imran Khan may be the one who stands to lose.

1) Makdoom Amin Fahim, PPP

2) Syed Khursheed Shah, PPPP

3) Qamar ur Zama Qaira, PPPP

4) Farooq H Naik, PPPP

5) Mushahid Hussain, PML-Q

6) Dr Farooq Sattar, MQM

7) Babar Ghauri, MQM

8) Afrasiab Khattak, ANP

9) Senator Abbas Afridi, FATA

With the founding leader of Minhaj-ul-Quran International (MQI) and chairman Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT), Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri.

The Decisions

1) The National Assembly shall be dissolved at any time before March 16, 2013, (due date), so that the elections may take place within the 90 days. One month will be given for scrutiny of nomination paper for the purpose of pre-clearance of the candidates under article 62 and 63 of the constitution so that the eligibility of the candidates is determined by the Elections Commission of Pakistan. No candidate would be allowed to start the election campaign until pre-clearance on his/her eligibility is given by the Election Commission of Pakistan.

2) The treasury benches in complete consensus with Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) will propose names of two honest and impartial persons for appointment as Caretaker Prime Minister.

3) Issue of composition of the Election Commission of Pakistan will be discussed at the next meeting on Sunday, January 27, 2013, 12 noon at the Minhaj-ul-Quran Secretariat. Subsequent meetings if any in this regard will also be held at the central secretariat of Minhaj-ul-Quran in Lahore. In pursuance to todays’ decision, the Law Minister will convene a meeting of the following lawyers: S. M. Zafar, Waseem Sajjad, Aitizaz Ahsan, Farough Naseem, Latif Afridi, Dr Khalid Ranja and Hamayoun Ahsan, to discuss these issues. Prior to the meeting of January 27, the Law Minister, Mr Farooq H Naek, will report the results of this legal consultation to the January 27 meeting.

4) Electoral Reforms: It was agreed upon that the focus will be on the enforcement of electoral reforms prior to the polls on:

A. Article 62, 63 and 218 (3) of the constitution

B. Section 77 to 82 of the Representation of Peoples’ Act 1976 and other relevant provisions relating to conducting free, fair, just and honest elections guarded against all corrupt practices.

C. The Supreme Court Judgement of June 8, 2012 on constitutional petition of 2011 must be implemented in Toto and in true letter and spirit.

5) With the end of the long march and sit-in, all cases registered against each other shall be withdrawn immediately and there will be no acts of victimisation and vendetta against either party or the participants of the march.

This declaration has been entered into in a cordial atmosphere and reconciliatory spirit.

Signatories of the declaration

Prime Minister of Pakistan Chairman Pakistan Awami Tehreek

Raja Pervez Ashraf Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri

Leader of the delegation and former Prime Minister Law Minister
Chaudry Shujaat Hussain Farooq H Naek

Makdoom Amin Fahim, PPP

Syed Khursheed Shah, PPPP

Qamar ur Zama Qaira, PPPP

Farooq H Naik, PPPP

Mushahid Hussain, PML-Q

Dr Farooq Sattar, MQM

Babar Ghauri, MQM

Afrasiab Khattak, ANP

Senator Abbas Afridi, FATA

To Whom It May Concern:

We would like to express our strong condemnation of the brutal killing of over eighty innocent civilians in the January 10, 2013 terrorist attacks in Quetta, Pakistan, conducted by the Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) organization. We call on the federal and provincial governments of Pakistan to bring to justice the perpetrators of these and other terrorist attacks against Pakistan’s Shia Muslims.

The attacks this Friday are the latest in what is a persistent and murderous campaign against Shia Muslims across Pakistan waged by the LeJ and its partners. Approximately 400 Shia Muslims were killed by the LeJ and its allies in 2012, according to Human Rights Watch. The anti-Shia violence in Pakistan has not been restricted to a single ethnic group or region. In recent years, it has included:

• the siege and killings of Shia Muslims in the Kurram Agency;

• the targeted killings of Shia Muslim professionals in Karachi as well as Hazara and non-Hazara Shia Muslims in Quetta;

• the mass murder of Shia Muslim pilgrims in Balochistan and Gilgit; and

• large terrorist attacks against Shia Muslim processions in Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, Rawalpindi.

According to international conventions and customary international law, these constitute genocidal acts perpetrated by terrorist groups like the LeJ.

With Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf’s visit to Quetta and the imposition of governor’s rule in Balochistan, there are indications that the Government of Pakistan (GoP) is attempting to take action to protect the area’s Shia Muslim community. But an all-of-government and all-of-Pakistan approach is necessary to stem the tide of anti-Shia violence, which has hit every corner of the country.

A concerted, nationwide campaign to investigate, arrest, and prosecute those responsible for anti-Shia violence is necessary. Such a campaign must be conducted under civilian command by the GoP, provincial governments in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh, and authorities in Gilgit-Baltistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, with the full support of the army, intelligence agencies, judiciary, and police. It must coincide with a broader effort to improve the prosecution of alleged terrorists, including the institution of witness protection programs.

Inaction by the federal and provincial governments and other arms of the state has enabled the LeJ threat to metastasize. The GoP must reverse course and fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizenry. Similarly, Pakistani journalists, military officials, politicians, religious leaders who have either supported anti-Shia organizations or have shied away from explicitly condemning them, must recognize the collective costs of complicity or silence and reverse course.

We are encouraged by the peaceful sit-ins that have taken place in cities such as Quetta, Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore, where thousands of Pakistanis have braved the cold to protest against the murderous campaign against Shia Muslims. We are heartened to see support from a broad segment of Pakistanis, transcending ethnic, regional, and religious boundaries. And we hope that the civic unity displayed by Pakistan’s Shia and Sunni Muslims, Christians, and others serves as permanent bridges that lead to a more peaceful and progressive Pakistan.

But a strong civil society cannot make up for weak government resolve in combating the rising tide of terror. The GoP must take decisive action to stop the genocidal campaign against Pakistan’s Shia Muslims. The LeJ, which has allied with al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, is not only an existential threat to the country’s Shia Muslims, but to all Pakistanis.

 We close with the words of German pastor Martin Niemöller, who warned of his countrymen’s indifference to the Nazi threat:

“First they came for the communists, and I didn’t speak out because I wasn’t a communist.

Then they came for the socialists, and I didn’t speak out because I wasn’t a socialist.

Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn’t speak out because I wasn’t a trade unionist.

Then they came for me, and there was no one left to speak for me.”

Sincerely,

Concerned Pakistani Americans

Waris Husain, Writer/ Attorney

Manzur Ejaz, Writer/Economist

Mohammad Taqi, Writer/Academic Physician

Arif Rafiq, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute

Omar Ali, MD, Writer/Academic Physician

Beena Sawar, Journalist/Documentary Filmmaker

Ayaz Muhammad Khan, Virginia

Zaid Jlani, Journalist/Activist

Raakin Iqbal, Architect/Producer